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Introduction
Supply chain management has become dependent on 
electronic systems; since the 2000s, we have seen the 
emergence of information technology solutions to sup-
port business operations, to share information, to con-
nect businesses, and to generate greater visibility along 
supply chains in order to gain knowledge and control of 
processes. On the other hand, although supply chains 
have pursued aspects such as the standardization of 
business processes, increased communication, con-
nectivity, and data exchange, the vulnerability of these 
systems to cyber-attacks is nevertheless increasing. 
Why is this? In modern supply chains, information is 
shared digitally more than any other way, and supply 
chains are so reliant on good quality information that, 
without it, supply chain managers cannot make de-
cisions on forecasts, production, distribution, etc. 
Equally importantly, poor data leads to poor decisions 
and performance. So, even with the most efficient and 
responsive supply chain, performance will be greatly 
compromised without good quality information.
For supply chains to thrive, managers must recognize 
that cyber-attacks are becoming common occurrences 
and that the "new normal" operating environment is 
one that is increasingly impacted by unknown risks. A 
key lesson for supply chain managers is that cyber-at-
tacks do not always "come through the front door"; a 
business can be greatly impacted by an attack on the 
weakest link in their supply chain. A key difficulty with 
cyber-attacks is that often a business will not know the 
Supply chains have become more vulnerable in recent years, and high-profile cyber-attacks 
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minute of the day, thereby becoming an easy and highly lucrative target for talented crimin-
als, causing financial losses as well as damaging brand reputation and value. Companies 
must therefore invest in supply chain capabilities to withstand cyber-attacks (i.e., cyber-resi-
lience) in order to guard against potential threats. They must also embrace the reality that 
this often-unknown dimension of risk is the "new normal". Although interest on this topic 
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Resilience is all about being able to overcome the 
unexpected. Sustainability is about survival. The goal 
of resilience is to thrive.
Jamais Cascio
Writer and futurist specializing in design strategies
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types of cyber-risks to which it has exposure, until it real-
izes that it is being attacked. Therefore, businesses must 
develop cyber-resilience to protect their supply chains.
Cyber-attacks can cause considerable economic costs to 
the companies that suffer these breaches, although the 
costs may not be noticed until after the damage is done. 
Estimates of the annual costs from cyber-crimes range 
from $375 billion to $575 billion (USD) (Intel Security, 
2014), with significant effects on supply chains and res-
ulting business performance with customers. Missing or 
erroneous data and information in supply chains, as a 
result of cyber-attacks, can lead to undesirable effects as 
diverse as intellectual property breaches, sub-standard 
or interrupted operations, sensitive data custody 
breaches, and decreases in service level to final custom-
ers. For example, some estimates indicate annual losses 
of £9.2bn from the theft of intellectual property and a 
further £7.6bn from industrial espionage.
Businesses that are able to understand what data is crit-
ical, where it is, who has access to it, and who is respons-
ible for it, as well as where potential risks are in terms of 
information and data in the supply chain, are those that 
will be able to correctly communicate these risks to the 
supply chain in order to implement actions to mitigate 
them.
However, there has been a lack of managerial action to 
acknowledge the relevance and impact of cyber-crime 
(Burnson, 2013; Deloitte, 2012, 2013). It has been stated 
that “only a few CEOs realize that the real cost of cyber-
crime stems from delayed or lost technological innova-
tion” (Bailey et al., 2014) and companies have likely un-
derestimated their risk (Intel Security, 2014). This is, 
either by delayed decision making or by a lack of aware-
ness, the resulting inaction is leading to higher organiza-
tional costs from cyber-crimes.
This inaction is compounded by the increasing complex-
ity of global supply chains and the speed and connectiv-
ity of operations required by companies to stay 
competitive. Furthermore, the growing skill of the at-
tackers to find novel ways of accessing crucial data (Reu-
ters, 2012), and the limited information and tools 
available to manage these threats, requires organiza-
tions to be more resilient to cyber-attacks that can 
cripple their supply chains. 
Companies can prepare for potential attacks by apply-
ing appropriate supply chain risk-management tools 
and techniques both to reduce the likelihood of an intru-
sion and to deal with any disruption should an attack 
be successful. Every business that depends on a supply 
chain needs to build in cyber-resilience. But what ex-
actly is cyber-resilience in the context of supply chains, 
and how can it be incorporated into current supply 
chain risk-management approaches? 
Cyber-risk has been defined by the Institute for Risk 
Management (IRM, 2015) as “any risk of financial loss, 
disruption or damage to the reputation of an organiza-
tion from some sort of failure of its information techno-
logy systems”. The ISO 27005:2008 defines information 
security risk as “the potential that a given threat will ex-
ploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets and 
thereby cause harm to the organization” (BSI, 2008). 
Both of these terms are being widely used in industry, 
and this article will consider these terms as equivalent.
We define supply chain cyber-resilience “as the capabil-
ity of a supply chain to maintain its operational per-
formance when faced with cyber-risk”.
In light of the above challenges, the purpose of this art-
icle is to create an agenda for future research that could 
help supply chain and IT personnel to recognize and 
take a proactive team-based approach to supply chain 
cyber-resilience. More specifically, the aims of this 
study are to:
1. Explore current supply chain risk and resilience
  frameworks
2. Analyze these frameworks and determine whether
  they incorporate cyber-risk
3. Create a research agenda for cyber-risk and cyber-
  resilience.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. 
First, the process used to find and review the key literat-
ure is explained. Next, the main findings of the literat-
ure review are discussed. Finally, a research agenda for 
supply chain cyber-resilience is proposed, including re-
commendations for both academia and industry.
Methodology
A systematic literature review was conducted, based on 
documented guidelines (Tranfield et al., 2003) through 
which a comprehensive, explicit, and reproducible 
method is followed. This method consists of ten steps 
that can be grouped into five main phases:
Technology Innovation Management Review April 2015
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1. Planning: The planning phase focused on defining a 
review question to guide the search: “Do the current 
supply chain risk and resilience frameworks incor-
porate cyber-risk?” 
2. Searching: The searching phase was guided by the 
identification of the relevant databases where the 
search was to be done, the keywords to be used dur-
ing these searches, and the appropriate timeframe 
for the resulting documents to be included in the re-
search. We searched for literature using the following 
databases: Scopus, Web of Science, ProQuest, and 
Google Scholar. The search keywords were determ-
ined from a knowledge domain analysis around the 
concept of cyber-resilience for the supply chain (see 
Figure 1). The three main knowledge domains to be 
scanned were identified as “supply chain manage-
ment”, “information technology management”, and 
“risk (& resilience) management”.
Figure 1. Main knowledge domains in supply chain 
cyber-risk management
3. Screening: After the initial, broad literature search 
was carried out, we conducted a preliminary analysis 
of the document titles and abstracts, if available. This 
step was followed by a more detailed analysis of the 
document abstracts, in the case of papers, and exten-
ded content in other cases. We applied explicit inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria (e.g., document type, 
themes covered, research approaches ) to identify a 
refined selection of documents for this analysis. Fi-
nally, the references of this refined set of articles 
were reviewed to identify relevant documents that 
might not have been identified through our initial 
broad search. Our final list consisted of 213 docu-
ments (24 articles, 137 peer-reviewed journal papers, 
51 reports by specialized agencies, and 1 thesis). The 
documents covered the areas of supply chain risk 
management (131 documents), supply chain cyber-
risk management (SCCRM), and information techno-
logy risk management (44 documents), ranging from 
the years 1998 to 2015. 
4. Extracting and synthesizing: The documents were 
analyzed and synthesized using a spreadsheet format 
that allowed us to categorize the documents accord-
ing to methodological approaches, contexts, out-
comes, etc.
5. Reporting: In the next section, we report on our find-
ings from the literature review.
Findings
Some of the earliest evidence of supply chain resilience 
can be found in the work of Christopher and Peck 
(2004), which was derived from earlier research on sup-
ply chain agility as a way of counteracting for uncer-
tainty in the demand (Christopher & Towill, 2001), This 
perspective emerged after the foot-and-mouth disease 
event in the United Kingdom and the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks in United States, both of which occurred in 2001. 
Christopher and Peck proposed a reference model for 
the characterization of resilience in the supply chain, 
and the main aspects contributing to supply chain resi-
lience were identified as re-engineering, organizational 
culture, agility, and collaboration.
Sheffi and Rice (2005) presented a disruption model 
based a proposed disruption theory for production sys-
tems (Asbjornslett, 1999), where this model was repres-
ented as a transient decrease in process performance. 
The Sheffi and Rice model identified eight sequential 
phases describing a disruption event: preparation, dis-
ruptive event, first response, initial impact, time of full 
impact, preparation for recovery, recovery, and long-
term impact. Based on this model, Sheffi and Rice pro-
pose an enterprise “vulnerability map” through which 
the different disruption event probabilities and con-
sequences are compared and ranked for prioritization.
Sheffi and Rice (2005) also identified product demand 
as the main source of uncertainty in the supply chain 
and acknowledged the increase in global uncertainty 
due to increased customer expectations, more global 
competition, longer and more complex supply chains, 
greater product variety, and shorter product lifecycles. 
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They considered organizational resilience as a strategic 
initiative to reduce vulnerability and therefore reduce 
the likelihood of occurrence of a disruption. Finally, 
they identified three important factors for building resi-
liency in an organization: redundancy, flexibility, and 
cultural change.
A number of other resilience frameworks have been 
suggested in literature. Linkov and colleagues (2013) 
proposed a resilience matrix of four steps representing 
a process for the event management cycles of disrup-
tions: i) plan/prepare, ii) absorb, iii) recover, and iv) ad-
apt. Each of these steps are described for different 
domains within the organization (i.e., physical, inform-
ation, cognitive, and social). These authors have further 
suggested how to measure resilience according to this 
matrix.
Based on the framework proposed by Christopher and 
Peck (2004) as well as an empirical research study to 
identify vulnerabilities and capabilities within organiza-
tions, Pettit, Fiskel, and Croxton (2010) proposed the 
supply chain resiliency assessment and management 
(SCRAM) framework. This framework identifies an act-
ive relationship between the capabilities and the vulner-
abilities in an organization, and its resulting resilience. 
They argue that the level of resilience that a company 
has to aim for is a balance between developing too 
many vulnerabilities (due to a lack of investment in cap-
abilities), which could result in disruptions with un-
desirable economic effects, and investing in too many 
capabilities, which would erode profitability. Hence, 
they highlight an economic tradeoff between invest-
ment (capabilities) and risk (vulnerabilities). 
Blackhurst, Dunn, and Craighead (2011) proposed a 
global resiliency framework based on systems theory 
and the framework proposed by Sheffi and Rice (2005). 
They distinguish between “resilience enhancers” and 
“resilience reducers”, which are organizational attrib-
utes that either increase or decrease the ability of a firm 
to recover quickly and efficiently from a disruptive 
event. They identified 13 resilience enhancers and sev-
en resilience reducers, each within three categories. 
Their work derives these attributes from an industrial 
setting and therefore can serve as basis for further re-
search in the empirical confirmation of these or other 
resilience attributes.
The World Economic Forum (WEF, 2013) presented a 
resilience framework as part of its Supply Chain Risk 
Initiative. This framework attempts to quantify the risk 
to an organization's physical and intangible assets 
through a combination of effects from the existing risks 
to the organization and its vulnerabilities. The World 
Economic Forum’s (WEF, 2013) resilience report also 
provides four recommendations for organizations to 
build resilient supply chains: i) put in place strong 
policies for the creation and adoption of resilience 
standards; ii) develop agile and adaptable strategies in 
organizations; iii) use data-sharing platforms for risk 
identification and response; and iv) enter into partner-
ships that involve all stakeholders in the risk assess-
ment process.
Cyber-risks within the supply chain resilience framework
Our literature review did not find any supply chain resi-
lience framework that incorporated the phenomenon 
of cyber-risk or information risk explicitly. However, 
our analysis revealed that the most influential sources 
for the development of cyber-resilience policy are the 
insurance industry, governmental requirements, and 
international organizations such as the World Econom-
ic Forum.
In 2012, the World Economic Forum created an initiat-
ive called “Partnering for Cyber-Resilience”, led by 
Elena Kvochko, as a response to the increasing import-
ance of cybersecurity. With more than 100 organiza-
tions involved, this initiative has created a series of 
reports describing principles for cybersecurity, recog-
nizing interdependence, leadership, integrated risk 
management, and uptake by partners in the supply 
chain, as crucial aspects for resilience building. Addi-
tionally Kvochko has recently published an initial 
framework for the measurement of cyber-threats, 
through the calculation of a cyber-risk value and by 
combining eight factors grouped in three categories: 
vulnerability, assets, and attacker profile (WEF, 2015).
At a government level, there are several initiatives in 
place concerning cyber-risk and cybersecurity. In 2003, 
the United States government published the “National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” (White House, 2003), 
and as part of a wider strategy from the Department of 
Homeland Security as a response to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and in line with Presidential Directive 63, which 
provides a framework for the protection of critical infra-
structure (White House, 1998). In 2005, Germany star-
ted the “National Plan for Information Infrastructure 
Protection”, with its main objectives being prevention, 
preparedness, and sustainability of the information in-
frastructure through the setting of international stand-
ards (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2005). By 
2015, all EU member states except Portugal had pub-
lished national cybersecurity strategies, with Estonia 
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having been the first in 2008 (ENISA, 2015; Keegan, 
2014). In 2013, the United States government released 
Presidential Policy 21 and Executive Order 13636 to fo-
cus national attention on cyber-infrastructure resili-
ence. In particular, Executive Order 13636 establishes a 
risk-based standard to protect critical infrastructure 
against cyber-threats. However, standards based on 
risk assessment do not necessarily create resilience 
(Linkov et al., 2013).
Conclusions and Recommendations
Our systematic literature review highlights that there is 
limited literature and no specific frameworks for cyber 
resilience in the supply chain, despite the increasing 
importance of the topic. The main supply chain resili-
ence theories were proposed in the early 2000s, and the 
main advancements to those theories have been 
through the empirical identification of organizational 
attributes that increase or decrease resilience, as well as 
theoretical relationships between organizational vul-
nerabilities and capabilities as related to resilience. Ad-
ditionally, we found that the existing supply chain 
resilience frameworks could be extended to consider cy-
ber-risks through aspects such as cultural change (Shef-
fi & Rice, 2005) or collaboration and organizational 
culture (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Cyber resilience the-
ory can also be advanced through the empirical quanti-
fication of the cyber-resilience of an organization, 
through case studies and stress testing of organizations 
with techniques such as non-invasive games (Gerenc-
ser et al., 2003). 
A key contribution of this article is a definition for sup-
ply chain cyber-resilience: “the capability of a supply 
chain to maintain its operational performance when 
faced with cyber-risk”. Furthermore, as a result of this 
study, we offer the following recommendations for aca-
demia with the goal of developing a future research 
agenda for supply chain cyber-resilience:
1. Develop theory to demystify cyber-risk and cyber-
resilience in supply chains: Academics should con-
duct in-depth (systematic) literature reviews that 
confirm or expand on this study to devise methods of 
incorporating cyber-resilience with existing frame-
works in supply chain resilience and indeed develop 
new models and frameworks. Finally, and funda-
mentally, they should align supply chain thinking 
and personnel with information technology issues 
and personnel to develop a team approach to supply 
chain cyber-resilience. 
2. Develop applicable tools and techniques: There is a 
need for models (e.g., models of dynamic behaviour, 
machine-learning models for real-time monitoring of 
performance conditions) and practitioner workbooks 
(e.g., to evaluate the likelihood of detection or the 
probability of attack), to help practitioners better 
manage the causes and effects of cyber-risk to the 
supply chain.
3. Generate  case  studies:  In-depth  and  longitudinal 
case studies within different industrial sectors are re-
quired to increase our understanding of the occur-
rence, detection, and reaction to cyber-attacks. Such 
case studies will enable researchers to validate theory 
and conceptual frameworks and models.
4. Investigate  the  different  types  of  cyber-attacks: 
Studies should examine the attack goals (e.g., data 
theft, data modification, data falsification), the tech-
nical nature of attacks (e.g., tools, physical or digital 
barriers, verification procedures, data integrity), as 
well as human dimensions (e.g., cyber-attacker mo-
tivation, incentives).
5. Propose strategic ways of managing cyber risks: For 
example, academia may suggest portfolio investment 
to hedge risk by diversifying the business structure, 
where different areas counterbalance the effect of cy-
ber-attacks. Furthermore, academia may suggest es-
tablishing appropriate key performance indicators or 
reviewing organizational culture and leadership, 
which should be empowered for proactive manage-
ment of supply chain cyber-resilience. 
For industry, we offer the following recommendations:
1. The search for solutions to cyber-risks must be ap-
proached in terms of distributed accountability, in-
stead of centralized authority: The increasingly 
complex supply arrangements are creating condi-
tions for “malevolent actors to recruit, coordinate 
and inflict harm across the whole network” (WEF, 
2012). This challenge will require companies to ad-
just the current paradigm of centrally controlling risk 
management with routine evaluation processes (De-
loitte, 2012).
2. Re-arrange  resources  and  develop  contingency 
plans when necessary: Organizations that thrive are 
those that can quickly recognize unusual operating 
conditions. It is no longer possible to prepare for 
every possible threat scenario. Instead, organizations 
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should prepare by encouraging team members to 
speak up when they detect an anomaly, having 
strategies in place to create customized contingency 
plans as necessary, and using automatic detection 
systems (e.g., machine learning) to identify real-time 
suspicious variations in performance indicators. 
There is a need for a new level of coordination in or-
ganizations for risk management and security re-
sponse. In environments with high volatility, central 
controls are not sufficient and “structural integration 
is key to addressing uncertainties” (Boyson, 2014).
3. Include   recovery   costs   in  the   cost   evaluation  of
cyber-attacks: Recovery costs can surpass the direct 
organizational losses from cyber-attacks (Ponemon, 
2014). Including recovery costs in the evaluations will 
highlight the real economic implications of delayed 
action.
4. Create a cyber-crisis team within each organiza-
tion: Such teams should be empowered to work 
across organizational silos.
5. Collaborate with academic institutions: Academics 
can assist companies through training programs in 
cyber-resilience, by introducing new tools for the 
evaluation of cyber-resilience, or by providing meth-
ods for the real-time monitoring of conditions (e.g., 
through machine-learning methods) to detect poten-
tial threats.
6. Promote a proactive culture: Organizations should 
provide incentives for early-bird alerts on anomalous 
operating conditions, which promote flexibility and a 
proactive response in the face of an unforeseen 
threat. 
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